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Abstract
A myriad of access control policy languages have been and continue to be proposed. e design of policy miners for each
such language is a challenging task that has required specialized machine learning and combinatorial algorithms. We present
an alternative method, universal access control policy mining (Unicorn). We show how this method streamlines the design of
policy miners for a wide variety of policy languages including ABAC, RBAC, RBAC with user-aribute constraints, RBAC with
spatio-temporal constraints, and an expressive fragment of XACML. For the laer two, there were no known policy miners
until now.
To design a policy miner using Unicorn, one needs a policy language and a metric quantifying how well a policy ts an
assignment of permissions to users. From these, one builds the policy miner as a search algorithm that computes a policy
that best ts the given permission assignment. We experimentally evaluate the policy miners built with Unicorn on logs
from Amazon and access control matrices from other companies. Despite the genericity of our method, our policy miners are
competitive with and sometimes even beer than specialized state-of-the-art policy miners. e true positive rates of policies
we mined dier by only 5% from the policies mined by the state of the art and the false positive rates are always below 5%. In
the case of ABAC, it even outperforms the state of the art.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and research problem
Numerous access control policy languages have been proposed over the last decades, e.g., RBAC (Role-Based Access Con-
trol) [26], ABAC (Aribute-Based Access Control) [37], XACML (eXtended Access-Control Markup Language) [34], and new
proposals are continually being developed, e.g., [78, 57, 10, 16, 7]. To facilitate the policy specication and maintenance
process, policy miners have been proposed, e.g., [31, 77, 52, 12, 33, 18, 56, 43]. ese are algorithms that receive an assign-
ment of permissions to users and output a policy that grants permissions to users that match as closely as possible the given
assignment.
Designing a policy miner is challenging and requires sophisticated combinatorial or machine-learning techniques. More-
over, policy miners are tailor-made for the specic policy language they were designed for and they are inexible in that
any modication to the miner’s requirements necessitates its redesign and reimplementation. For example, miners that mine
RBAC policies from access control matrices [31] are substantially dierent from those that mine RBAC policies from access
logs [56]. As evidence for the diculty of this task, despite extensive work in policy mining, no miner exists for XACML [34],
which is a well-known, standardized language.
Any organization that wishes to benet from policy mining faces the challenge of designing a policy miner that ts its own
policy language and its own requirements. is problem, which we examine in Section 3, is summarized with the following
question: is there a more general and more practical method to design policy miners?
Figure 1: Workow for designing a policy miner using Unicorn.
1.2 Contribution
We propose a radical shi in the way policy miners are built. Rather than designing specialized mining algorithms, one per
policy language, we propose Unicorn, a universal method for building policy miners. Using this method, the designers of
policy miners no longer must be experts in machine learning or combinatorial optimization to design eective policy miners.
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Our method gives a step-by-step procedure to build a policy miner from just the policy language and an objective function that
measures how well a policy ts an assignment of permissions to users.
Let Γ be a policy language. We sketch below and in Figure 1 the workow for designing a policy miner for Γ using
Unicorn.
Policy language and objective function (Sections 4 and 5) e miner designer species a template formula for Γ in a
fragmentL of rst-order logic. Template formulas are explained in Section 4. e designer also species an objective function
L that measures how well a policy ts a permission assignment.
Probability distribution (Section 5) From ϕ and L, we dene a probability distribution P on policies, conditioned on
permission assignments. A permission assignment is a relation between the set of users and the set of permissions. e
policy miner is a program that receives as input a permission assignment Auth and aims to compute the most likely policy
conditioned on Auth ; that is, the policy I that maximizes P (I | Auth).
Approximation (Section 6) Computing maxI P (I | Auth) takes time exponential in the size of Auth and I, encoded as
strings. Moreover, the function P (I | Auth) has many local maxima. Hence, we use deterministic annealing and mean-eld
approximation [62, 61, 11, 9] to derive an iterative procedure that computes a distribution q on policies that approximates
P (I | Auth). Computing arg maxI q (I) takes time polynomial in the size of Auth and I.
Implementation (Section 7) e policy miner is a procedure that computes and maximizes q. One need not understand
mean-eld approximations or deterministic annealing to implement the policy miner. We provide a set of rewriting rules and
pseudocode that guide step by step q’s computation and maximization (see Algorithm 1 and Lemma 2).
In summary, designing a policy miner for a policy language previously required expertise in machine learning and com-
binatorial algorithms. Unicorn reduces this to the task of specifying a template formula and implementing q’s maximization.
We illustrate how specifying template formulas requires only the background in rst-order logic provided in this paper and
how it amounts to just formalizing the language’s semantics in rst order logic, a task that is substantially simpler than
designing a machine-learning or a combinatorial algorithm.
1.3 Applications and evaluation
Using Unicorn, we have built miners for dierent policy languages like RBAC, ABAC, and RBAC with user aributes. Fur-
thermore, we have built policy miners for RBAC with spatio-temporal constraints and an expressive fragment of XACML, for
which no miner existed before. We present them in Sections 8 and 9 and in the appendix.
In Section 10, we conduct an extensive experimental evaluation using datasets from all publicly available real-world case
studies on policy mining. We compare the miners we built with state-of-the-art miners on both real-world and synthetic
datasets. e true positive rates of the policies mined by our miners are within 5% of the true positive rates of the policies
mined by the state of the art. For policy languages like XACML or RBAC with spatio-temporal constraints, the true positive
rates are above 75% in all cases and above 80% in most of them. e false positive rates are always below 5%. For ABAC
policies, we mine policies with a substantially lower complexity and higher precision than those mined by the state of the art.
is demonstrates that with Unicorn we can build a wide variety of policy miners, including new ones, that are competitive
with or even beer than the state of the art.
Unicorn’s eectiveness follows from the wide applicability of deterministic annealing (DA). is technique has been
applied to dierent optimization problems like the traveling salesman problem [61], clustering [62], and image segmenta-
tion [36]. DA can also be applied to policy mining. However, in our case, computing the distribution P (I | Auth) required
by DA is intractable. Hence, we use mean-eld approximation (MFA) to compute a distribution q that approximates P. is
distribution q is much easier to compute. Moreover, our approach of DA with MFA turns out to generalize to a wide variety
of policy languages.
We examine related work and draw conclusions in Sections 11 and 12. For details on deterministic annealing and mean-
eld approximation, we refer to the literature [62, 61, 11, 9].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Policy mining
Organizations dene organizational policies that specify which permissions each user in the organization has. Such policies
are usually described in a high-level language. To be machine enforceable, policy administrators must specify this policy as
an (access control) policy in a machine-readable format. is policy assigns permissions to users and is formalized in a policy
language. e policy is then enforced by mechanisms that intercept each request (a pair consisting of a user and a permission)
and check whether it is authorized.
Organizations are highly dynamic. New users come and existing users may go. Moreover, groups of users may be trans-
ferred to other organizational units. Such changes induce changes in the access control policy, which are usually manually
implemented, giving rise to the following problems. First, the policy may become convoluted and policy administrators no
longer have an overview on who is authorized to do what. Second, policy administrators may have granted to users more
permissions than needed to do their jobs. is makes the organization vulnerable to abuse by its own users, who may exploit
the additional permissions and harm the organization.
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To address these problems, numerous policy miners have been proposed [31, 77, 52, 12, 33, 18, 56, 43]. We describe some of
them in Section 3.1. Policy miners are algorithms that receive as input the current permission assignment, which is a relation
between the set of users and the set of permissions. e permission assignment might be given as an access control matrix
or a log of access requests showing the access decisions previously made for each request. It describes the organization’s
implemented knowledge on which permissions should be assigned to which users. e miner then constructs a policy that is
as consistent as possible with the permission assignment and can be expressed using the organization’s policy language.
A policy miner aims to solve the two problems mentioned above. First, it can mine succinct policies that grant permissions
consistent with the given permission assignment. Second, policy miners can mine policies that assign only those permissions
that users necessarily need. An administrator can then compare the mined policy with the currently implemented policy
in order to detect permissions that are granted by the current policy, but that are not being exercised by the users. Policy
administrators can then inspect those permissions and decide if they are necessary for those users.
e problem of policy mining is dened as follows. Given a permission assignment and an objective function, compute
a policy that minimizes the objective function. Usually, objective functions measure how well a policy ts a permission
assignment and how complex a policy is. We give examples of objective functions later in Sections 5 and 8.
2.2 ality criteria for policy miners
Policy miners can be regarded as machine-learning algorithms. erefore, they are evaluated by the quality of the policies
they mine, and here two criteria are used:
Generalization [30, 18, 56] A mined policy should not only authorize requests consistent with the given permission
assignment. It must also correctly decide what other permissions should be granted to users who perform similar functions
in the organization. is is particularly important when mining from logs. For example, if most of students in a university
have requested and been granted access to a computer room, then the mined policy should grant all students access to the
computer room rather than just to those who previously requested access to it. For a formal denition of generalization, we
refer to previous work and standard references in machine learning [18, 30, 9]. One popular machine-learning method to
evaluate generalization is cross-validation [32, 9], which we recall in Appendix B.1.
Complexity [12, 77] A mined policy should not be unnecessarily complex, as the policies are usually reviewed and audited
by humans. is is especially important when mining with the goal of refactoring an existing policy or migrating to a
new policy language. However, there is no standard formalization of a policy’s complexity, not even for established policy
languages like RBAC or ABAC. Each previous work has dened its own metrics to quantify complexity [18, 76, 77, 29]. We
discuss some of these metrics in Section 8 and show how Unicorn is able to work with all of them.
3 e problem of designing policy miners
3.1 Status quo: specialized solutions
Numerous policy languages exist for specifying access control policies, which fulll dierent organizational requirements.
Moreover, new languages are continually being proposed. Some of them formulate new concepts, like extensions of RBAC
that can express temporal and spatial constraints [60, 15, 49, 69, 13, 1, 20]. Other languages facilitate policy specication in
specialized seings such as distributed systems [34, 70] or social networks [28].
Motivated by the practical problem of maintaining access control congurations, researchers have proposed policy min-
ers for a variety of policy languages. Moreover, for some policy languages, these miners optimize dierent objectives. For
example, initial RBAC miners mined policies with a minimal number of roles [72, 51, 63, 74, 80]. Subsequent miners mined
policies that are as consistent as possible with the user-aribute information [56, 30, 75].
e development of policy miners is non-trivial and generally requires sophisticated combinatorial and machine-learning
algorithms. Recent ABAC miners have used association rule mining [18] and classication trees [14]. e most eective
RBAC miners use deterministic annealing [30] and latent Dirichlet allocation [56].
e proposed miners are so specialized that it is usually unclear how to apply them to other policy languages or even to
extensions of the languages for which they were conceived. For example, dierent extensions of RBAC that support spatio-
temporal constraints have been proposed over the last two decades, e.g., [60, 15, 49, 69, 13, 1, 20]. However, not a single miner
has been proposed for these extensions. Miners have only recently emerged that mine RBAC policies with constraints, albeit
only temporal ones [53, 54, 66]. As a result, if an organization wants to use a specialized policy language, it must invent its
own policy miner, which is challenging and time-consuming.
3.2 Alternative: A universal method
To facilitate the development of policy miners, we propose a new method, universal access control policy mining (Unicorn).
With this method, organizations no longer need to spend substantial eort designing specialized policy miners for their
unique and specic policy languages; they only need to perform the following tasks (see also Figure 1). First, they specify a
template formula ϕ for the organization’s policy language. We explain later in Section 4 what a template formula is. Second,
they specify an objective function. Finally, they implement the miner as indicated by the algorithm template in Section 7. We
formalize these tasks in the next sections.
3
4 A universal policy language
In order to obtain a universal method, we need a framework for specifying policy languages. We choose many-sorted rst-
order logic [24, 23], which has been used to model and reason about numerous policy languages, e.g. [3, 40, 19, 71].
Let Γ be a policy language for which we want to design a policy miner. In this section we explain the rst task: the miner
designer must specify a template formula ϕΓ for Γ. is is a rst-order formula that fullls some conditions that we explain
later in Denition 5. We show how Γ can be identied withϕΓ ∈ L and how policies in Γ can be identied with interpretation
functions that interpret ϕΓ’s symbols. We thereby reduce the problem of designing a policy miner to designing an algorithm
that searches for a particular interpretation function.
We start by recalling rst-order logic (Section 4.1). en we provide some intuition on template formulas using RBAC
(Section 4.2). Aerwards, we propose a fragment L of rst-order logic that is powerful enough to contain template formulas
for a variety of policy languages like RBAC, ABAC, and an expressive fragment of XACML (Section 4.3). We then dene
template formulas (Section 4.4) and give an example of a template formula for RBAC (Section 4.5).
4.1 Background in rst-order logic
We provide here an overview of basic many-sorted rst-order logic and conventions we employ. e reader familiar with logic
can read this section lightly. We work only with nite rst-order structures. at is, structures whose carrier sets are nite.
Later, in our examples, we will see that nite structures are still powerful enough to model practical scenarios, as organizations
do not need to handle innite sets. Even for the case of strings and integers, organizations oen only use a nite subset of them.
Denition 1. A signature is a tuple (S,R,F,V) fullling the following, where S is a nite non-empty set of sorts, R is a
nite non-empty set of relation symbols, F is a nite non-empty set of function symbols, and V is a countable set of variables.
Each relation and each function symbol has an associated type, which is a sequence of sorts. Furthermore, we assume the
existence of two sortsUSERS,PERMS ∈ S, denoting the users and the permissions in the organization, respectively. We also
assume the existence of the sortsBOOL, INTS, STRS, which represent Boolean values, integers, and strings, respectively. 
We denote sorts with CAPITAL BOLD leers, relation symbols with CAPITAL ITALIC leers, and function symbols
and variables with small italic leers. To agree with standard notation, we write a relation symbol’s type (S1, . . . , Sk) as
S1 × . . .× Sk instead. We write a function’s symbol’s type (S1, . . . , Sk) as S1 × . . .× Sk−1 → Sk instead. We allow k = 1
and, in that case, we call function symbols constant symbols. We denote constant symbols with small serif leers.
Denition 2. Let Σ be a signature. We dene (rst-order) terms as those expressions built from Σ’s variables and function
symbols in the standard way. We also dene (rst-order) formulas as those expressions obtained from terms by using relation
symbols, terms, and logical operators in the standard way. 
We only allow well-typed terms and formulas and associate to every term a type in the standard way. In addition, we
consider only quantier-free formulas. For a formula ϕ, if {x1, . . . , xn} is the set of all variables occurring in it, then we
sometimes write ϕ (x1, . . . , xn) instead of ϕ to clarify which variables occur in ϕ.
Denition 3. Let Σ be a signature. A Σ-structure is a pair K = (S, I). Here, S is a function mapping each sort S in Σ
to a nite non-empty set SS, called S’s carrier set. S must map BOOL, INTS, and STRS to the sets of Boolean values, a
nite set of integers, and a nite set of strings, respectively. I is a function mapping (i) each relation symbol R in Σ of type
S1 × . . . × Sk to a relation RI ⊆ SS1 × . . . × SSk and (ii) each function symbol f in Σ of type S1 × . . . × Sk−1 → Sk to
a function fI : SS1 × . . . × SSk−1 → SSk . In particular, a constant symbol of sort S is mapped to an element in SS. For any
symbol W in Σ, we call W I, K’s interpretation ofW . e function I is called an interpretation function. 
When Σ is irrelevant or clear from the context, we simply say structure instead of Σ-structure. We denote elements of
carrier sets with small serif leers like a and b.
Let (S, I). e interpretation function I gives rise in the standard way to a function that maps any formulaϕ (x1, . . . , xn),
with xi of sort Wi, to a relation ϕI ⊆ WS1 × . . . ×WSn . For (a1, . . . an) ∈ WS1 × . . . ×WSn , ϕI(a1, . . . an) holds if the
formula ϕ evaluates to true aer replacing each xi with ai.
4.2 Motivating example
We present an example of a template formula ϕRBACN for the language ΓN of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. We
then show that every RBAC policy in Γ can be identied with an interpretation function. With this example, we provide some
intuition on an argument we give later in Section 4.4: mining a policy in a policy language Γ is equivalent to searching for
an interpretation function that interprets the symbols occurring in a template formula for Γ.
Denition 4. An RBAC policy is a tuple pi = (U,Ro, P,Ua,Pa). U and P are non-empty sets denoting, respectively,
the sets of users and permissions in an organization. Ro is a set denoting the organization’s roles. Ua ⊆ U × Ro and
Pa ⊆ Ro×P are binary relations. e policy pi assigns a permission p ∈ P to a user u ∈ U if (u, p) ∈ Ua ◦Pa (i.e., if there
is a role r ∈ Ro such that (u, r) ∈ Ua and (r, p) ∈ Pa). 
Consider the language ΓN of RBAC policies with at most N roles. We now present a template formula for ΓN . We only
provide some intuition here and give formal justications in Section 4.5. Let Σ be a signature with two relation symbols UA
and PA of types USERS× ROLES and ROLES× PERMS, respectively. Let
ϕRBACN (u, p) :=
∨
i≤N
(UA (u, ri) ∧ PA (ri, p)) . (1)
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Here, u and p are variables of sorts USERS and PERMS, respectively, and ri, for i ≤ N , is a constant of sort ROLES. We
now make two observations about ϕRBACN (u, p).
1) Each RBAC policy in ΓN corresponds to at least one interpretation function Note that for any Σ-structure K =
(S, I) , the tuple
piK =
(
USERSS,ROLESS,PERMSS,UAI,PAI
)
(2)
is an RBAC policy. Conversely, one can show that every RBAC policy in ΓN can be associated with a Σ-structure. Observe
now that, when an organization wants to mine an RBAC policy, S is already known. Indeed, the organization knows the set
of users and permissions. It may not known the set of roles, but it can deduce them from UAI and PAI, once it knows I.
Analogously, for all policy languages we studied, we observed that S was always known by the organization. erefore, we
always assume S given and xed and we conclude that every RBAC policy in ΓN corresponds to at least one interpretation
function.
2) e formula ϕRBACN describes ΓN ’s semantics More precisely, if piK has at most N roles, then for any user u in K
and any p in K: piK assigns p to u i
(
ϕRBACN
)I
(u, p). is follows from two arguments. First, by denition, piK assigns p to
u if (u, p) ∈ UAI ◦ PAI. Second, UAI ◦ PAI = (ϕRBACN )I.
ese two observations describe the essence of a template formula. Template formulas dene (i) how interpretation
functions can represent policies of a policy language and (ii) how a policy (represented by an interpretation function) decides
if a permission is assigned to a user.
4.3 Language denition
Template formulas are built from the fragment L of quantier-free rst-order formulas.
For any signature, we require the organization to specify, for every relation and function symbol, whether it is rigid or
exible. Rigid symbols are those for which the organization already knows the interpretation function. Flexible symbols
are those for which an interpretation function must be found using mining. For example, a function that maps each user
to a unique identier should be modeled with a rigid function symbol, as the organization is not interested in mining new
identiers. In contrast, when mining RBAC policies, one should dene a exible relation symbol to denote the assignment of
roles to users, as the organization does not know this assignment and wants to compute it using mining.
Let K = (S, I) be a structure. We can see I as the union of two interpretation functions Ir and If , where Ir takes
as input rigid symbols and If takes as input exible symbols. e goal of policy mining is to search for an interpretation
function If for the exible symbols that minimizes an objective function. It does not need to search for S as these function
denes the carrier sets for sorts like USERS and PERMS, which the organization already knows. It does not need to search
for Ir either. Hence, we assume that S and Ir are xed and known to the organization. We also let U = USERSS and
P = PERMSS. We underline rigid symbols and do not distinguish between W and W Ir .
4.4 Template formulas
We now formalize template formulas. Let Γ be a policy language and let Pol(Γ) be the set of all policies that can be specied
with Γ. Suppose also that the set of access requests is modeled with a set TS1 × . . . × TS` , where T1, . . . ,T` are sorts. For
example, for RBAC and many other policy languages that we discuss here, the set of requests isU×P = USERSS×PERMSS.
We assume that the semantics of Γ denes a relation assignΓ ⊆ Pol (Γ)× TS1 × . . .× TS` , such that for (t1, . . . , t`) ∈
TS1 × . . . × TS` and pi ∈ Pol(Γ), (pi, t1, . . . , t`) ∈ assignΓ i pi authorizes (t1, . . . , t`). For example, in RBAC, (pi, u, p) ∈
assignRBAC i pi assigns p to u.
Denition 5. Let Γ be a policy language and ϕ(t1, . . . , t`) be a formula in L, where t1, . . . , t` are variables of sorts
T1, . . . ,T`, respectively. e formula ϕ(t1, . . . , t`) is a template formula for Γ if there is a function M such that (i) M
is a surjective function from the set of interpretation functions to Pol (Γ) and (ii) for any interpretation function I and any
request (t1, . . . , t`) ∈ TS1 × . . .× TS` , we have that (t1, . . . , t`) ∈ ϕI i (M (I) , t1, . . . , t`) ∈ assignΓ. 
e mapping M provides a correspondence between interpretations and policies. M guarantees that each policy is
represented by at least one interpretation. erefore, we can search for an interpretation instead of a policy. For this reason,
for the rest of the paper, we identify every formula in L with a policy language and also refer to interpretation functions as
policies.
4.5 Formalizing the example
We now formally dene the formula ϕRBACN (u, p) ∈ L, introduced in Section 4.2, and show that it is a template formula for
the language ΓN of all RBAC policies with at mostN roles. Allowing a maximum number of roles is sucient as one always
can estimate a trivial bound on the maximum number of roles in an organization.
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Template formula denition: Consider a signature with a sort ROLES denoting roles and with two (exible) binary
relation symbols UA and PA of types USERS× ROLES and ROLES× PERMS, respectively. Dene the formula
ϕRBACN (u, p) :=
∨
i≤N
(UA(u, ri) ∧ PA(ri, p)) . (3)
Here, ri, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is a rigid constant symbol of sort ROLES (recall that we underline rigid symbols and denote
constant symbols with serif leers). One could also use exible constant symbols for roles, but, as we see later, the diculty
of implementing the policy miner increases with the number of exible symbols.
Correctness proof: We now dene a mappingM that proves that ϕRBACN is a template formula for ΓN . For any inter-
pretation function I, letM (I) = (U, {r1, . . . , rN}, P,UAI,PAI) . Observe thatM (I) is an RBAC policy. Moreover, for
(u, p) ∈ U × P , (u, p) ∈ (ϕRBACN )I i (u, p) ∈ UAI ◦ PAI i (piI, u, p) ∈ assignRBAC . It is also easy to prove thatM is
surjective on the set of all RBAC policies with at mostN roles. Hence, we can identify ϕRBACN with the language of all RBAC
policies with at most N roles. 
Example 1. To facilitate understandingM, we show an RBAC policy pi and an interpretation function I such thatM (I) =
pi.
Let N = 2 and assume that U = {Alice,Bob,Charlie} and that P = {c,m, d}. e permissions in P stand for “create”,
“modify”, and “delete”. Let r1 and r2 denote two roles. Consider the RBAC policy dened by Tables 1 and 2.
r1 r2
Alice ×
Bob ×
Charlie ×
Table 1: User-
assignment relation
c m d
r1 × ×
r2 ×
Table 2: Permission-
assignment relation
We can dene an interpretation function I such that M (I) corresponds to the RBAC policy above. I interprets the
relation symbols UA and PA in the formula ϕRBACN (u, p) as follows. For u ∈ U and i ≤ 2, UAI (u, ri) i (u, ri) is marked
with an × in Table 1. Similarly, for p ∈ P and i ≤ 2, PAI (ri, p) i (ri, p) is marked with an × in Table 2. 
5 Probability distribution
Let ϕ ∈ L be a policy language. We assume for the rest of the paper that ϕ has two free variables u and p of sorts USERS
and PERMS, respectively. Our presentation extends in a straightforward way to more general cases.
To design a policy miner using Unicorn one must specify an objective function L. is is any function taking two inputs:
a permission assignment Auth ⊆ U × P , which is a relation on U and P indicating what permissions each user has, and a
policy I. An objective function outputs a value in R+ measuring how well ϕI ts Auth and other policy requirements. e
policy miner designer is in charge of specifying such a function. In Section 8, we give other examples of objective functions.
For illustration, consider the objective function
L (Auth, I;ϕ) =
∑
(u,p)∈U×P
∣∣∣Auth(u, p)− ϕI(u, p)∣∣∣ . (4)
Here, we identify the value 1 with the Boolean value true and the value 0 with the Boolean value false. Observe that
L (Auth, I;ϕ) is the size of the symmetric dierence of the relations Auth and ϕI. Hence, lower values for L (Auth, I;ϕ)
are beer.
e policy miners built with Unicorn are probabilistic. ey receive as input a permission assignmentAuth and compute
a probability distribution over the set of all policies in a xed policy language Γ. We use a Bayesian instead of a frequentist
interpretation of probability. e probability of a policy I does not measure how oen I is the outcome of an experiment,
but rather how strong we believe I to be the policy that decided the requests in Auth .
We now dene, given a permission assignment Auth , a probability distribution P (· | Auth) on policies. We rst provide
some intuition on P (· | Auth)’s denition and aerwards dene it. For a permission assignment Auth and a policy I, we
can see P (· | Auth) as a quantity telling us how much we believe I to be the organization’s policy, given that Auth is the
organization’s permission assignment.
Policy miners receive as input a permission assignmentAuth and then search for a policy I∗ that maximizes P (· | Auth).
Here, P (· | Auth) is dened as the “most general” distribution that fullls the following requirement: for any policy I, the
lower L (Auth, I;ϕ) is, the more likely I is. Following the principle of maximum entropy [45], the most general distribution
that achieves this is
P (I | Auth) = exp (−βL(Auth, I;ϕ))∑
I′ exp (−βL(Auth, I′;ϕ))
, (5)
where I′ ranges over all policies. Recall that we consider only nite structures. Hence, all our carrier sets are nite, so there
are only nitely many policies.
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e value β > 0 is a parameter that the policy miner varies during the search for the most likely policy. e search
uses deterministic annealing, an optimization procedure inspired by simulated annealing [46, 62, 61]. In our case, it initially
sets β to a very low value, so that all policies are almost equally likely. en it gradually increases β while, at the same
time, searching for the most likely policy. As β increases, those policies that minimize L(Auth, · ;ϕ) become more likely. In
this way, deterministic can escape from low-quality local maxima of P (· | Auth). When β → ∞, only those policies that
minimize L(Auth, · ;ϕ) have a positive probability and the search converges to a local maximum of P (· | Auth).
We now dene the probability distribution given in Equation 5.
Denition 6. For a formula ϕ ∈ L, we dene the probability space Pϕ =
(
Ω, 2Ω,P (· | Auth)) as follows.
• Ω is the set of all interpretation functions (i.e., policies).
• 2Ω is the set of all subsets of Ω. Since all carrier sets of all sorts are nite (Denition 3), Ω and 2Ω are nite.
• For I ∈ Ω,
P (I | Auth) = exp (−βL(Auth, I;ϕ))∑
I′ exp (−βL(Auth, I′;ϕ))
. (6)
Finally, for O ∈ 2Ω, let P (O | Auth) = ∑I∈O P (I | Auth).

e following theorem proves that P (· | Auth) is the “most general” distribution that fullls the requirement mentioned
above. More precisely, P (· | Auth) is the maximum-entropy probability distribution where the probability of a policy I
increases whenever L(Auth, I;ϕ) decreases [39, 68].
eorem 1. P (· | Auth) is the distribution P on policies that maximizes P ’s entropy and is subject to the following con-
straints.
•
∑
I P (I)L(Auth, I;ϕ) ≤ `, for some xed bound `.
• If β > 0, then P (I) > P (I′), for any two policies I and I′ with L(Auth, I;ϕ) < L(Auth, I′;ϕ).
Proof. It suces to drop the second constraint and use Lagrange multipliers to verify that P (I | Auth) is the optimal distri-
bution. Observe that P (I | Auth) satises the second constraint.
Example 2. We illustrate the probability distribution dened above for the language of all RBAC policies with at most N
roles, dened in Section 4.5. For simplicity, we x N = 2 in this example. Assume that U = {Alice,Bob,Charlie} and that
P = {c,m, d}, as dened in Example 1. Assume given a permission assignment Auth and two policies I1 and I2 as shown
in Tables 3–9.
Recall that
(
ϕRBACN
)I1 and (ϕRBACN )I2 are the permission assignments induced by I1 and I2, respectively. Observe that(
ϕRBACN
)I1 andAuth dier by one entry, whereas (ϕRBACN )I2 andAuth dier by two. Hence,L (Auth, I1;ϕRBACN ) = 1 <
2 = L
(
Auth, I2;ϕ
RBAC
N
)
. As a result, for any β > 0, we get that P (I1 | Auth) = exp(−β)Z > exp(−2β)Z = P (I2 | Auth) ,
where Z =
∑
I′ exp (−βL(Auth, I′;ϕ)). 
c m d
Alice × ×
Bob × ×
Charlie × ×
Table 3: Auth
rI11 r
I1
2
Alice ×
Bob ×
Charlie ×
Table 4: UAI1
rI21 r
I2
2
Alice ×
Bob ×
Charlie ×
Table 5: UAI2
c m d
rI11 × ×
rI12 ×
Table 6: PAI1
c m d
rI21 ×
rI22 × ×
Table 7: PAI2
7
c m d
Alice × ×
Bob × ×
Charlie ×
Table 8:
(
ϕRBACN
)I1
c m d
Alice ×
Bob ×
Charlie × ×
Table 9:
(
ϕRBACN
)I2
6 Applying mean-eld approximation
e policy miner that is built withUnicorn is an algorithm that receives as input a permission assignmentAuth and computes
a policy I that approximately maximizes P (· | Auth), while leing β →∞. Since computing P (· | Auth) is intractable, we
use mean-eld approximation [9], a technique that denes an iterative procedure to approximate P (· | Auth) with a distri-
bution q (·). It turns out that computing and maximizing q(·) is much easier than computing and maximizing P (· | Auth).
e policy miner is then an algorithm implementing the computation of q and its maximization.
We next introduce some random variables that help to measure the probability that a policy authorizes a particular request
(u, p) ∈ U × P (Section 6.1). Aerwards, we present the approximating distribution q (Section 6.2).
6.1 Random variables
Recall that the sample space Ω of the distribution P (· | Auth) from Denition 6 is the set of all policies I. Let X be a random
variable mapping I ∈ Ω to I. Although X’s denition is trivial, it will help us to understand other random variables that we
introduce later. We can understandX as an “unknown policy” and, for a policy I, the probability statement P (X = I | Auth)
measures how much we believe that X is actually I, given that the organization’s permission assignment is Auth . By deni-
tion, P (X = I | Auth) = P (I | Auth).
Denition 7. Let ϕ ∈ L and let W be a exible relation symbol occurring in ϕ of type S1 × . . .× Sk and let f be a exible
function symbol occurring inϕ of type S1×. . .×Sk → S. Let (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ SS1 ×. . .×SSk . Recall thatSmaps sorts to carrier
sets. We dene the random variable WX (a1, . . . , ak) : Ω → {0, 1} that maps (Auth, I) ∈ Ω to W I (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, we dene the random variable fX (a1, . . . , ak) : Ω → SS that maps (Auth, I) ∈ Ω to fI (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ SS. We
call these random variables random facts of ϕ. 
Example 3. Let us examine some random facts of the formulaϕRBACN from Example 2. One such random fact isUAX (Alice, r1),
which can take the values 0 and 1, so UAX (Alice, r1) is a Bernoulli random variable whose probability distribution is dened
by
P
(
UAX (Alice, r1) = 1 | Auth
)
=
P
({
I ∈ Ω | UAI (Alice, r1) = 1
}
| Auth
)
. (7)
More generally, the set of random facts for ϕRBACN is
F
(
ϕRBACN
)
=
{
UAX (u, ri) | u ∈ U, i ≤ N
}
∪{
PAX (ri, p) | p ∈ P, i ≤ N
}
. (8)
If we set N = 2 and replace each random fact with a Boolean value, as indicated by Tables 4 and 5, then we get an RBAC
policy.
Just like a statement of the form P (X = I | Auth) quanties how much we believe that X = I for a given Auth , a
statement of the form P
(
UAX (Alice, r1) = 1 | Auth
)
quanties how much we believe that role r1 is assigned to Alice for a
given Auth . 
Observation 1. Since we assume carrier sets to be nite, a random fact always has a discrete distribution. In particular,
random facts built from exible relation symbols have Bernoulli distributions as they can only take Boolean values. 
We usually denote random facts with Fraktur leers f, g, . . . For a random fact f of the form WX (a1, . . . , ak), we de-
note by fI the Boolean value W I (a1, . . . , ak). Similarly, when f is of the form fX (a1, . . . , ak), we denote by fI the value
fI (a1, . . . , ak). Finally, we denote f’s range with Range (f).
For a policy language ϕ ∈ L, we denote by F (ϕ) the set of all random facts of ϕ. Recall that we assume all our carrier
sets to be nite, so F (ϕ) is nite.
Observe that, for any formula ϕ ∈ L, replacing each random fact f in F (ϕ) with a value in Range (f) yields a policy.
Hence, a policy miner, instead of searching for a policy I, it just searches for adequate values for all random facts in F (ϕ).
We formalize this in Lemma 1, whose proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. For a policy language ϕ ∈ L,
P (I | Auth) = P
((
fX
)
f∈F(ϕ)
=
(
fI
)
f∈F(ϕ)
| Auth
)
. (9)
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We denote by h (·) the function P
((
fX
)
f∈F(ϕ) = · | Auth
)
. To avoid cluered notation, we write h (I) instead of
h
((
fI
)
f∈F(ϕ)
)
.
We conclude this section by dening some other useful random variables. Recall that X is the random variable that maps
I ∈ Ω to I.
Denition 8. For (u, p) ∈ U × P , ϕ ∈ L, we dene the random variable ϕX (u, p) : Ω → {0, 1} as the function mapping
(Auth, I) to ϕI (u, p). 
Denition 9. For ϕ ∈ L, Auth ⊆ U × P , we dene the following random variable:
L (Auth,X;ϕ) :=
∑
(u,p)∈U×P
∣∣∣Auth(u, p)− ϕX(u, p)∣∣∣ . (10)

6.2 Approximating the distribution
A mean-eld approximation of the probability distribution h is a distribution q dened by
q (I) :=
∏
f∈F(ϕ)
qf
(
fI
)
, (11)
where qf : Range (f) → [0, 1] is a probability mass function for f. Hence, ∑b∈Range(f) qf (b) = 1. For b ∈ Range (f), the
value qf (b) denotes the probability, according to qf, that f = b.
Observe that q (I)’s factorization implies that the set of random facts is mutually independent. is is not true in general,
as h may not be necessarily factorized like q. is independence assumption is imposed by mean-eld theory to facilitate
computations. Our experimental results in Section 10 show that, despite this approximation, we still mine high quality policies.
According to mean-eld theory, the distributions {q̂f | f ∈ F (ϕ)} that make q best approximate h are given by
q̂f (b) =
exp (−βEf7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)])∑
b′∈Range(f) exp
(−βEf7→b′ [L (Auth,X;ϕ)]) , (12)
where b ∈ Range (f) and Ef 7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)] is the expectation of L (Auth,X;ϕ) aer replacing every occurrence of the
random fact f with b [9]. is expectation is computed using the distribution q. erefore,
Ef7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)]
=
∑
I
∏
g∈F(ϕ)
g6=f
q̂g
(
gI
)
(L (Auth, I;ϕ) {f 7→ b}) . (13)
Here, L (Auth, I;ϕ) {f 7→ b} is obtained from L (Auth, I;ϕ) by replacing f with b.
Using Lemma 1 and the distribution q, we can approximate arg maxI P (I | Auth) by maximizing q.
Observation 2. maxI P (I | Auth) = maxI h (I) ≈ maxI q (I) .
e desired miner is then an algorithm that computes q, while leing β → ∞, and then computes the policy I∗ that
maximizes q.
7 Building the policy miner
To compute q, as given by Equation 11, the desired policy miner could use Equation 12 to compute q̂f, for each f ∈ F (ϕ).
Observe, however, that Equation 12 is recursive, since the computation of the expectations on the right hand side requires
{q̂f | f ∈ F (ϕ)}, as indicated by Equation 13. is recursive dependency is handled by iteratively computing, for each f ∈
F (ϕ), a function q˜f that approximates q̂f [9]. We illustrate this in the step 2a below.
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudocode for computing and maximizing q, which is the essence of the desired policy miner. We
give next an overview.
1. Initialization (lines 2–3). Each distribution q˜f is randomly set to an arbitrary function such that
∑
b q˜f(b) = 1.
2. Update loop (lines 4–8). We perform a sequence of iterations that update {q˜f | f ∈ F (ϕ)} and β. e number T of
iterations is xed before execution.
(a) Parameter update (line 5–7). At each iteration, we compute a random ordering RS(F (ϕ)) of all the random
facts. en, for each f in that order, q˜f is updated to the right-hand side of Equation 12 (lines 6–7), but instead of
using {q̂f | f ∈ F (ϕ)}, we use {q˜f | f ∈ F (ϕ)} to compute the expectations.
(b) Hyper-parameter update (line 8). Aer each iteration, we increase β by a factor ofα, dened before execution.
is approach, originally dened for deterministic annealing, avoids that the algorithm is trapped in a bad local
maximum in the early iterations [62, 61].
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Algorithm 1: e policy miner.
1 PolicyMiner(L,Auth, ϕ, α, β, T ):
2 for f ∈ F (ϕ):
3 Randomly initialize q˜f.
4 for i = 1 . . . T :
5 for f ∈ RS (F (ϕ)):
6 for b ∈ Range (f):
7 q˜f (b)← exp (−βEf 7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)])∑
b′ exp
(−βEf 7→b′ [L (Auth,X;ϕ)]) .
8 β ← α× β.
9 Dene I∗ by leing fI
∗
= arg maxb q˜f(b), for f ∈ F (ϕ).
10 return I∗.
3. Policy computation (line 9). Finally, we compute the policy I∗ = arg maxI q (I). By looking at Equation 11, we
see that to maximize q, it suces to maximize qf, for every f ∈ F (ϕ). Hence, we let I∗ be the policy that satises
fI
∗
= arg maxb∈Range(f) q˜f(b).
Observe that the policy miner requires values for the hyper-parameters α, β, and T as input. Adequate values can be
computed using machine-learning methods like grid search [64], which we briey recall in Appendix B.2.
7.1 Simplifying the computation of expectations
One need not be knowledgeable about deterministic annealing or mean-eld approximations to implement Algorithm 1 in a
standard programming language. e only part requiring knowledge in probability theory is the computation of the expec-
tations in line 7. We now dene the notion of diverse random variables and show that expectations of some diverse random
variables can easily be computed recursively using some basic equalities.
Denition 10. A random variable X is diverse if (i) it can be constructed from constant values and random facts using only
arithmetic and Boolean operations and (ii) any random fact is used in the construction at most once. 
Example 4. Let (u, p) ∈ U × P and let V , W , and Y be exible relation symbols. en V X (u, p) + WX (u, p) is diverse,
but V X (u, p)WX (u, p) +WX (u, p)Y X (u, p) + V X (u, p)Y X (u, p) is not, since each random fact there occurs more than
once. 
Corollary 1. Let ϕ ∈ L and (u, p) ∈ U × P , then ϕX (u, p) is diverse i every atomic formula that occurs in ϕ occurs
exactly once.
is corollary is a direct consequence of Denition 10. Observe that, for ϕ ∈ L, one can check in time linear in ϕ’s length
that every atomic formula occurring in ϕ occurs exactly once.
Example 5. Recall the formula ϕRBACN dened in Section 4.5. Observe that each atomic formula occurs exactly once. Hence,
for (u, p) ∈ U × P , the random variable (ϕRBACN )X (u, p) is diverse. 
e following lemma, proved in Appendix C, shows how to recursively compute Ef7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)] when ϕX(u, p) is
diverse.
Lemma 2. Let f and g be facts, ϕ be a formula in L, (u, p) ∈ U × P , and {ψi}i ⊆ L. Assume that ϕX(u, p) and(∧
i ψi
)X
(u, p) are diverse. en the following equalities hold.
Ef 7→b[g] =
{
b if f = g and∑
b∈Range(g) q˜g (b) b otherwise.
Ef 7→b
[
(¬ϕ)X (u, p)
]
= 1− Ef7→b
[
ϕX(u, p)
]
.
Ef 7→b
(∧
i
ψi
)X
(u, p)
 = ∏
i
Ef 7→b
[
ψXi (u, p)
]
.
Ef7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)] =
∑
(u,p)∈U×P
∣∣∣Auth(u, p)− Ef7→b[ϕX(u, p)]∣∣∣ .
Recall that ∧ and ¬ form a complete set of Boolean operators. So one can also use this lemma to compute expectations
of diverse random variables of the form (ϕ→ ψ)X (u, p) and (ϕ ∨ ψ)X (u, p).
8 RBAC mining with Unicorn
We explain next how to use Unicorn to build an RBAC miner.
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8.1 RBAC policies
We already explained how the formula ϕRBACN ∈ L is a template formula for the language of all RBAC policies with at most
N roles. To implement Algorithm 1, we only need a procedure to compute Ef7→b
[
L
(
Auth,X;ϕRBACN
)]
. Since, as noted in
Example 5,
(
ϕRBACN
)X
(u, p) is diverse, we can apply Lemma 2 to show that
Ef 7→b
[
L
(
Auth,X;ϕRBACN
)]
=∑
(u,p)∈U×P
∣∣∣∣Auth(u, p)− Ef 7→b[(ϕRBACN )X (u, p)]∣∣∣∣ .
Ef 7→b
[(
ϕRBACN
)X
(u, p)
]
=
1−
∏
i≤N
(
1− Ef7→b
[
UAX(u, ri)
]
Ef 7→b
[
PAX(ri, p)
])
,
where,
Ef7→b
[
UAX(u, ri)
]
=
{
b if UAX(u, ri) = f∑
b q˜UAX(u,ri) (b) b otherwise.
Ef7→b
[
PAX(ri, p)
]
is computed analogously.
Observe how the computations of expectations is reduced to a simple rewriting procedure by applying Lemma 2. We can
now implement an RBAC miner by implementing Algorithm 1 in a standard programming language and using the results
above to compute the needed expectations.
8.2 Simple RBAC policies
e objective function used above has a limitation. When the number of role constants N used by ϕRBACN (u, p) is very
large, we might obtain a policy I˜ that assigns each role to exactly one user. e role assigned to a user would be assigned all
permissions that the user needs. As a result, L(Auth, I˜;ϕRBACN ) = 0, but I˜ is not a desirable policy. We can avoid mining
such policies by introducing in the objective function a regularization term that measures the complexity of the mined policy
I. A candidate regularization term is:
‖I‖ =
∑
i≤N
∑
u∈U
UAI(u, ri) +
∑
p∈P
PAI(ri, p)
 .
Observe that ‖I‖measures the sizes of the relationsUAI andPAI, for i ≤ N , thereby providing a measure of I’s complexity.
We now dene the following loss function:
LrRBAC (Auth, I) = λ ‖I‖+ L(Auth, I;ϕ).
Here λ > 0 is a trade-o hyper-parameter, which again must be xed before executing the policy miner and can be estimated
using grid search. Note that LrRBAC penalizes not only policies that substantially disagree with Auth , but also policies that
are too complex.
e computation of Ef 7→b[LrRBAC (Auth,X)] now also requires computing Ef7→b[‖X‖], where ‖X‖ is the random variable
obtained by replacing each occurrence of I in ‖I‖ with X. Fortunately, one can see that ‖X‖ is diverse. Hence, we can use
the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2 to compute all needed expectations.
9 Mining spatio-temporal RBAC policies
We now use Unicorn to build the rst policy miner for RBAC extensions with spatio-temporal constraints [1, 19, 41, 8, 4, 5].
In policies in these extensions, users are assigned permissions not only according to their roles, but also based on constraints
depending on the current time and the user’s and the permission’s locations. e syntax for specifying these constraints
allows for policies like “a user is assigned the role Engineer from Monday through Friday and from 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM”
or “the role Engineer is granted permission to access any object within a radius of three miles from the main building.”
We present a template formula ϕst(t, u, p) ∈ L for a policy language that we call spatio-temporal RBAC. is is an
extension of RBAC with a syntax for spatial constraints based on [4, 5] and a syntax for temporal constraints based on
temporal RBAC [6].
ϕst(t, u, p) =
∨
i≤N
(ψUA(t, u, ri) ∧ ψPA(t, ri, p)) .
Here, we assume the existence of a sort TIME and that t is a variable of this sort representing the time when u exercises
p. We also assume the existence of a sort SPACE that we use to specify spatial constraints. e formulas ψUA(t, u, ri) and
ψPA(t, ri, p) describe when a user is assigned the role ri and when a permission is assigned to the role ri, respectively. We
use the rigid constants r1, . . . , rN to denote roles.
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e grammar Γst below denes the syntax of ψUA and ψPA.
〈cstr list〉 ::= 〈cstr〉 ( ∧ 〈cstr〉 )∗
〈cstr〉 ::= 〈sp cstr〉 ( ∨ 〈sp cstr〉 )∗ |
〈tmp cstr〉 ( ∨ 〈tmp cstr〉 )∗
〈sp cstr〉 ::= (¬?) isWithin (Loc (o) , d, b)
〈tmp cstr〉 ::= ψcal (t)
An expression in this grammar is a conjunction of constraints, each of which is either a disjunction of temporal constraints
or a disjunction of spatial constraints.
9.1 Modeling spatial constraints
A spatial constraint is a (possibly negated) formula of the form isWithin (Loc (o) , d, b), where o is a variable of sort USERS
or PERMS, Loc (o) denotes o’s location, d is a exible constant symbol of a sort whose carrier set is N≤M = {0, 1, . . . ,M}
(where M is a value xed in advance), and b is a exible constant symbol of a sort describing the organization’s physical
facilities. For example, isWithin (Loc (u) , 4,MainBuilding) holds when the user represented by u is within 4 space units of
the main building.
Intuitively, the formula isWithin (Loc (o) , d, b) evaluates whether the entity represented by o is located within d spatial
units from b. Observe that a policy miner does not need to compute interpretations for rigid function symbols like Loc or
rigid relation symbols like isWithin , since they already have a xed interpretation.
9.2 Modeling temporal constraints
A temporal constraint is a formula ψcal (t) that represents a periodic expression [6], which describes a set of time intervals. We
give here a simplied overview and refer to the literature for full details [6].
Denition 11. A periodic expression is a tuple (yearSet ,monthSet , daySet , hourSet , hourDuration) ∈ (2N)4 × N. A
time instant is a tuple (y,m, d, h) ∈ N4. e time instant satises the periodic expression if y ∈ yearSet , m ∈ monthSet ,
d ∈ daySet , and there is an h′ ∈ hourSet such that h′ ≤ h ≤ h′ + hourDuration . 
Previous works on analyzing temporal RBAC with SMT solvers [40] show that temporal constraints can be expressed as
formulas in L. Furthermore, one can verify that any expression in Γst and, therefore, ϕst is in L.
As an objective function, we use λ ‖I‖ + L (Auth, I;ϕst). Here, ‖I‖ counts the number of spatial constraints plus the
sum of the weighted structural complexities of all temporal constraints [66]. For computing expectations, one can show that
‖X‖ is diverse and that every atomic formula in ϕst occurs exactly once. Hence, one can compute all necessary expectations
using the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2.
10 Experiments
In this section, we experimentally validate two hypotheses. First, using Unicorn, we can build policy miners for a wide
variety of policy languages. Second, the policies mined by these miners have as low complexity and high generalization
ability as those mined by the state of the art.
10.1 Datasets
Our experiments are divided into the following categories.
Mine RBAC policies from access control matrices We use three access control matrices from three real organizations,
named “healthcare”, “rewall”, and “americas” [25]. For healthcare, there are 46 users and 46 permissions, for rewall, there
are 720 users and 587 permissions, and for americas, there are more than 10,000 users and around 3,500 permissions. We refer
to these access control matrices as RBAC1, RBAC2, and RBAC3.
Mine ABAC policies from logs We use four logs of access requests provided by Amazon for a Kaggle competition in
2013 [43], where participants had to develop mining algorithms that predicted from the logs which permissions must be
assigned to which users. We refer to these logs as ABAC1, ABAC2, ABAC3, and ABAC4.
Mine business-meaningful RBAC policies from access control matrices We use the access control matrix provided
by Amazon for the IEEE MLSP 2012 competition [38], available at the UCI machine learning repository [50]. It assigns three
types of permissions, named “HOST”, “PERM GROUP”, and “SYSTEM GROUP” to 30,000 users. e number of permissions
for each type are approximately 1,700, 6,000, and 20,000, respectively. For each type of permission, we sampled 5,000 users
from all 30,000 users and used all permissions of that type to build an access control matrix. We explain in detail how we
create these matrices in Appendix G.1. We refer to these matrices as BM-RBAC1, BM-RBAC2, and BM-RBAC3.
12
RB
AC
1
RB
AC
2
RB
AC
3
AB
AC
1
AB
AC
2
AB
AC
3
AB
AC
4
BM
-RB
AC
1
BM
-RB
AC
2
BM
-RB
AC
3
XA
CM
L1
XA
CM
L2
XA
CM
L3
XA
CM
L4
XA
CM
L5
XA
CM
L6
XA
CM
L7
ST
AR
BA
C
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
TP
R
Unicorn Others
Figure 2: Comparison of the TPRs between policies mined using Unicorn and policies mined by the state of the art across
dierent policy languages. Policies with higher TPRs are beer at granting permissions to the correct users.
Mine XACML policies from access controlmatrices We use Continue [47, 27], the most complex set of XACML policies
in the literature. We use seven of the largest policies in the set. For each of them, we compute the set of all possible requests
and decide which of them are authorized by the policy. We then mine a policy from this set of decided requests. For the
simplest policy, there are around 60 requests and for the most complex policy, there are more than 30,000 requests. We call
these seven sets of requests XACML1, XACML2, …, XACML7.
Mine spatio-temporal RBAC policies from logs ere are no publicly available datasets for mining spatio-temporal
RBAC policies. Based on policies provided as examples in recent works [4, 5], we created a synthetic policy and a synthetic
log by creating 1,000 access requests uniformly at random and evaluating them against the policy. We refer to this log as
STARBAC. e synthetic policy is described in Appendix G.2.
10.2 Methodology
For RBAC and ABAC, we mine two policies in the corresponding policy language’s syntax. e rst one using a miner built
using Unicorn and the second one using a state-of-the-art miner. Details on the miners built using Unicorn are given in
Sections 8 and 9, and Appendices D and E. For RBAC, we use for comparison the miner presented in [30] and, for ABAC,
we use for comparison the miner from [18]. For XACML and spatio-temporal RBAC, there are no other known miners. For
business meaningful RBAC, we contacted the authors of miners for this RBAC extension [30, 56], but implementations of
their algorithms were not available.
As an objective function we use λ ‖I‖ + L (Auth, I;ϕ), where λ is a trade-o hyper-parameter, ‖I‖ is the complexity
measure dened for I in the policy language, andϕ is the template formula for the corresponding policy language. e values
for the hyper-parameters were computed using grid search.
To evaluate miners for RBAC, BM-RBAC, and XACML, we use 5-fold cross-validation [22, 79, 21], as described in Ap-
pendix B. To measure the mined policy’s generalizability, we measure its true positive rate (TPR) and its false positive rate
(FPR) [59]. To measure a mined policy’s complexity, we use ‖I‖. To evaluate miners for ABAC and STARBAC, which receive
a log instead of an access control matrix as input, we use universal cross-validation [18]. We measure the mined policy’s TPR,
FPR, precision, and complexity. We considered only those mined policies whose FPR was below 5%.
All policy miners, except the one for BM-RBAC, were developed in Python 3.6 and were executed on machines with 2,8
GHz 8-core CPUs and 32 GB of RAM. e miner for BM-RBAC was developed in Pytorch version 0.4 [58] and executed on an
NVIDIA GTX Titan X GPU with 12 GB of RAM. For all policy languages except STARBAC, our experiments nished within
4 hours. For STARBAC, they took 7 hours. We remark that organizations do not need to mine policies on a regular basis, so
policies need not be mined in real time [18].
10.3 Results
Figures 2–4 compare, respectively, the TPRs, complexities, and precisions of the policies we mined with those mined by the
state of the art across the dierent datasets with respect to the dierent policy languages. We make the following observations.
• We mine policies whose TPR is within 5% of the state-of-the-art policies’ TPR. For the XACML and STARBAC scenarios,
where no other miners exist, we mine policies with a TPR above 75% in all cases.
• In most cases, we mine policies with a complexity lower than the complexity of policies mined by the state of the art.
• When mining from logs, we mine policies that have a similar or greater precision than those mined by the state of the
art, sometimes substantially greater.
• In all cases, we mine policies with an FPR ≤ 5% (not shown in the gures).
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Figure 3: Comparison of the complexities between policies mined using Unicorn and policies mined using the state of the art
across dierent policy languages. Policies with lower complexities are beer as they are easier to interpret by humans. For
XACML and STARBAC, there is no known miner, but we compared the mined policy’s complexity with that of the original
policy.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the precision between policies mined using Unicorn and policies mined by a state of the art policy
miner across dierent policy languages. Policies with higher precision are beer as they avoid incorrect authorizations. We
only compare the precision of mined policies when mining from logs, as discussed in [18].
10.4 Discussion
Our experimental results show that, with the exception of ABAC, all policies we mined aain a TPR of at least 80% in most of
the cases. e low TPR in ABAC is due to the fact that the logs contain only 7% of all possible requests [18]. But even in that
case, the ABAC miner we built aains a TPR that is within 5% of the TPR aained by the state of the art [18]. Moreover, our
ABAC miner mines policies with substantially lower complexity and higher precision. ese results support our hypothesis
that by using Unicorn we can build competitive policy miners for a wide variety of policy languages.
ese results also suggest that the miners built are well-suited for practical use. In this regard, note that policy miners
are tools that facilitate the specication and maintenance of policies. ey are not intended to replace human policy admin-
istrators, especially when the miners work on logs. is is because logs contain just an incomplete view of how permissions
should be assigned to users. Very sparse logs, like those used for the experiments on ABAC, contain barely 7% of all possible
authorization requests. Hence, we cannot expect policy miners to deduce how all permissions should be assigned from such
logs. e policy administrator must review the mined policy and specify how it should decide groups of requests that are
not well represented in the log. For this reason, mined policies must also be simple. e main application of policy miners is
to reduce the cumbersome eort of manually analyzing logs (or, more generally, permission assignments) and mine policies
that generalize well (see Section 2.2).
Observe that the mined policies correctly authorize at least 40% of future requests in all cases for ABAC and that in some
cases they correctly authorize 80% of all requests. All this with a false positive rate below 5%. is means that the mined
policy has already reduced the policy administrator’s work by at least 40% and in most of the cases by at least 80%. e
administrator now only needs to decide how the policy should decide groups of requests that are not represented in the log.
11 Related work
11.1 Policy mining
11.1.1 RBAC mining
Early research on policy mining focused on RBAC [25, 48, 73]. e approaches developed used combinatorial algorithms to
nd, for an assignment of permissions to users, an approximately minimal set of role assignments, e.g., [72, 51, 63, 74, 80].
A major step forward was the use of machine-learning techniques like latent Dirichlet allocation [56] and deterministic an-
nealing [30, 67] to compute models that maximize the likelihood of the given assignment of permission to users. More recent
works mine RBAC policies with time constraints [53, 54] and role hierarchies [66, 35], using combinatorial techniques that
are specic to the RBAC extension.
Despite the plethora of RBAC miners, there are still many RBAC extensions for which no miner has been developed.
A recent survey in role mining [55], covering over a dozen RBAC miners, reports not a single RBAC miner that can mine
spatio-temporal constraints, even though there have been several spatio-temporal extensions of RBAC since 2000, e.g., [60,
14
15, 49, 69, 13, 1, 20], and additional extensions are under way [4, 5]. Unicorn oers a practical solution to mining RBAC
policies for these extensions. As illustrated in Section 9, we can now mine spatio-temporal RBAC policies.
11.1.2 Other miners
Miners have recently been proposed for other policy languages like ABAC [76, 18] and ReBAC (Relationship-Based Access
Control) [12]. ese algorithms use dedicated combinatorial and machine-learning methods to mine policies tailored to the
given policy language. Unicorn has the advantage of being applicable to a much broader class of policy languages.
11.2 Interpretable machine learning
Machine-learning algorithms have been proposed that train an interpretable model [44, 42, 65, 17, 2] consisting of a set of
human-readable rules that describe how an instance is classied. Such algorithms are aractive for policy mining, as policies
must not only correctly grant and deny access, they should also be easy to understand.
e main limitation of the rules mined by these models is that they oen do not comply with the underlying policy
language’s syntax. State-of-the-art algorithms in this eld [65, 17, 2] produce rules that are simply conjunctions of constraints
on the instances’ features. is is insucient for many policy languages, like XACML, where policies can consist of nested
subpolicies that are composed with XACML’s policy combination algorithms [34].
e main advantage of Unicorn is that it can mine policies that not only correctly grant and deny access in most cases,
but are also compliant with a given policy language’s syntax, like XACML. Moreover, as illustrated in Section 8.2, one can
tailor the objective function so that the policy miner searches for a simple policy.
12 Conclusion
e diculty of specifying and maintaining access control policies has spawned a large and growing number of policy lan-
guages with associated policy miners. However, developing such miners is challenging and substantially more dicult than
creating a new policy language. is problem is exacerbated by the fact that existing mining algorithms are inexible in that
they cannot be easily modied to mine policies for other policy languages with dierent features. In this paper, we demon-
strated that it is in fact possible to create a universal method for building policy miners that works very well for a wide variety
of policy languages.
We validated Unicorn’s eectiveness experimentally, including a comparison against state-of-the-art policy miners for
dierent policy languages. In all cases, the miners built using Unicorn are competitive with the state of the art.
As future work, we plan to automate completely the workow in Figure 1. We envision a universal policy mining algo-
rithm based on Algorithm 1 that, given as input the policy language, the permission assignment, and the objective function,
automatically computes the probabilistic model and the most likely policy constrained by the given permission assignment.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. For a policy language ϕ ∈ L,
P (I | Auth) = P
((
fX
)
f∈F(ϕ)
=
(
fI
)
f∈F(ϕ)
∣∣∣∣Auth) . (14)
Proof. e rst equality follows from X’s denition, so we prove the second equality only. Let F be the random vector(
fX
)
f∈F(ϕ). at is, F is a random variable that maps I′ ∈ Ω to
(
fI
′)
f∈F(ϕ)
. It suces to show that E1 := {I} and
E2 :=
{
I′ | F (I′) = (fI)
f∈F(ϕ)
}
are the same. To achieve this, it suces to show that, for any I′, if F (I′) = (fI)
f∈F(ϕ)
then I′ = I. But this is true, as the values
(
fI
)
f∈F(ϕ) also turn out to completely determine I. We conclude then that
E1 = E2, which yields the desired result.
B Evaluating policy miners
We describe here evaluation methods for policy miners. Recall from Section 2.2 that policy miners are evaluated by the
generalization and the complexity of the policies they mine.
For the sake of clarity, we assume that a policy minerM is a program that receives as input a subsetA ⊆ U×P denoting
the currently known permission assignment.
B.1 Cross-validation
To measure the complexity of a mined policy, one simply evaluates a suitable metric on the policy. Measuring a mined policy’s
generalization is harder and is related to a fundamental question in machine learning: how to measure a model’s prediction
accuracy on new data. e generalization ability can be measured with a technique called cross-validation [32]. We give an
informal overview and point to the references for a formal explanation [9, 32]. In particular, for cross-validation in RBAC, we
refer to [30], and for cross-validation in ABAC with logs, we refer to [18].
In cross-validation, we take a representative set Q ⊆ U × P of all possible requests. Recall that a request is a pair
consisting of a user and a permission. We assume known a relation Auth ⊆ U × P that species which requests should
be authorized. e set Q is then split uniformly at random into two disjoint sets: a training set Tr and a testing set Ts .
Auth ∩ Tr is given as input to the policy miner. Let pi be the mined policy. Let A := Ts ∩ Auth and D := Ts \ A. Let
Aˆ := {q ∈ Ts | pi(q) = 1} be the requests authorized by the policy and let Dˆ := Ts \ Aˆ. We measure the mined policy’s
generalizability with the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate (FPR) [59]:
TPR :=
∣∣∣Aˆ ∩A∣∣∣
|A| FPR :=
∣∣∣Aˆ ∩D∣∣∣
|D| .
Intuitively, since the TPR and the FPR are computed on requests that were not part of the miner’s input, they evaluate how
well the mined policy decides new requests in the future. Hence, good policies have a high TPR and a low FPR.
K-fold cross-validation is is a variant of cross-validation. Instead of spliing Q into two disjoint sets, Q is split uni-
formly at random into K sets Q1, . . . , QK . Aerwards, for each i ≤ K , one performs cross-validation using ∪j 6=iQj as a
training set and Qi as a testing set. Each of these K iterations is called a fold. Finally, one measures the average of the true
positive rates and the average of the false positive rates over all K folds.
B.2 Grid search for policy mining
Policy miners sometimes require input values for hyper-parameters. To determine the values that make the miners compute
the best policies, we use grid search [64], which we briey recall next.
Let α1, . . . , αN be the hyper-parameters of a policy miner. In grid search, for i ≤ N , one denes a set Di of candidate
values. en for each (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ D1 × . . . × DN , one executes cross-validation using (a1, . . . , aN ) as values for
the hyper-parameters. Let TPR (a1, . . . , aN ) and FPR (a1, . . . , aN ) be the TPR and FPR of the policy mined during that
execution of cross-validation, respectively. Finally, one chooses the tuple (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) that maximizes TPR (a1, . . . , aN )
subject to FPR (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ) ≤ c. e threshold c for the FPR is arbitrary (we used 0.05) and can be adjusted. It denes a
maximum bound of false positives that can be tolerated from a mined policy.
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C Simplifying the computation of expectations
We prove here Lemma 2. We start with some auxiliary lemmas and denitions.
Lemma 3. Let f and g be facts, ϕ be a formula in L, (u, p) ∈ U × P , and {ψi}i ⊆ L such that {ψXi (u, p)}i is a set of
mutually independent random variables under the distribution q.
Ef7→b[g] =
{
b if f = g∑
b∈Range(g) q˜g (b) b otherwise.
Ef 7→b
[
(¬ϕ)X (u, p)
]
= 1− Ef7→b
[
ϕX(u, p)
]
.
Ef 7→b
(∧
i
ψi
)X
(u, p)
 = ∏
i
Ef7→b
[
ψXi (u, p)
]
.
Proof. Observe that, for a Bernoulli random variable X , E [X] = P (X = 1). Recall also that E [XY ] = E [X]E [Y ], when-
ever X and Y are mutually independent. With these observations and using standard probability laws, one can derive the
equations above.
Lemma 4. Let ϕ ∈ L and let (u, p) ∈ U × P . If ϕX (u, p) is diverse, then Ef7→b
[
ϕX (u, p)
]
can be computed using only the
equations from Lemma 2.
is lemma is proved by induction on ϕ and by recalling that any two dierent random facts are independent under the
distribution q, which follows from the way that the distribution q is factorized.
Corollary 2.
Ef 7→b[L (Auth,X;ϕ)] =
∑
(u,p)∈U×P
∣∣∣Auth(u, p)− Ef 7→b[ϕX(u, p)]∣∣∣ .
Proof. L (Auth,X;ϕ) can be rewrien as follows:∑
(u,p)∈Auth
(
1− ϕX (u, p)
)
+
∑
(u,p)∈U×P\Auth
ϕX(u, p).
e result follows from the linearity of expectation.
Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 4 and Corollary 2.
D Policy miners built using Unicorn
We present here technical details on how we built policy miners for dierent policy languages using Unicorn.
D.1 ABAC policies
ABAC is an access control paradigm where permissions are assigned to users depending on the users’ and the permission’s
aribute values. An ABAC policy is a set of rules. A rule is a set of aribute values. Recall that a request (u, p) is a pair
consisting of a user u ∈ U and a permission p ∈ P . A rule assigns a permission p to a user u if u and p’s permission aribute
values contain all of the rule’s aribute values. A policy assigns p to u if some rule in the policy assigns p to u.
When mining ABAC policies, we are not only given a permission assignmentAuth ⊆ U×P , but also aribute assignment
relations UAtt ⊆ U ×AttVals and PAtt ⊆ P ×AttVals that describe what aribute values each user and each permission
has. Here, AttVals denotes the set of possible aribute values. We refer to previous work for a discussion on how to obtain
these aribute assignment relations [77, 18].
e objective in mining ABAC policies is to nd a set of rules that assigns permissions to users based on the users’ and
the permissions’ aribute values. We explain next how to build a policy miner for ABAC using Unicorn. Let Rules and
AttVals be sorts for rules and aribute values, respectively. Let RUA and RPA be exible binary relation symbols of type
Rules ×AttVals . For M,N ∈ N, the formula ϕABACM,N (u, p) below is a template formula for ABAC:∨
i≤N
∧
j≤M
( (
RUA
(
si, aj
)→ UAtt(u, aj))∧(
RPA
(
si, aj
)→ PAtt(p, aj))
)
. (15)
In this formula, si, for i ≤ N , is a rigid constant symbol of sort Rules denoting a rule. e symbol aj , for j ≤ M , is a
rigid constant denoting an aribute value. e formula RUA
(
si, aj
)
describes whether rule si requires the user to have the
aribute value aj . e formula RPA
(
si, aj
)
describes an analogous requirement. We use two rigid relation symbols UAtt
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and PAtt to represent the aribute assignment relations. e formulas UAtt
(
u, aj
)
and PAtt
(
p, aj
)
describe whether u
and p, respectively, are assigned the aribute value aj . Intuitively, the formula ϕ
ABAC
M,N (u, p) is satised by (u, p) ∈ U × P
if, for some rule si, (u, p) possesses all user and permission aribute values required by si under RUA and RPA.
Observe that a policy miner does not need to nd an interpretation for the symbols UAtt and PAtt because the organiza-
tion already has interpretations for those symbols. When mining ABAC policies, the organization already knows what aribute
values each user and each permission has and wants to mine from them an ABAC policy. e miner only needs to specify
which aribute values must be required by each rule. is is why we specify the aribute assignment relations with rigid
symbols.
We use L(Auth, I;ϕABACM,N ) as the objective function. Observe that every atomic formula occurs at most once in ϕABACM,N ,
so, by Corollary 1, we can use Lemma 2 to compute all relevant expectations.
Finally, we can also add a regularization term to L(Auth, I;ϕABACM,N ) to avoid mining policies with too many rules or
unnecessarily large rules. One such regularization term is
‖I‖ =
∑
i≤N
∑
j≤M
RUAI
(
si, aj
)
+ RPAI
(
si, aj
)
.
e expression ‖I‖ counts the number of aribute values required by each rule, which is a common way to measure an
ABAC policy’s complexity [77, 18]. If we instead use the objective function λ ‖I‖+ L(Auth, I;ϕABACM,N ), then the objective
function penalizes not only policies that dier substantially from Auth , but also policies that are too complex. Observe that
‖X‖ is diverse. Hence, we can use the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2 to compute all expectations needed to implement
Algorithm 1.
D.2 ABAC policies from logs
Some miners are geared towards mining policies from logs of access requests [56, 76, 18]. We now present an objective func-
tion that can be used to mine ABAC policies from access logs, instead of permission assignments. We let ϕ := ϕABACM,N for
the rest of this subsection.
A logG is a disjoint union of two subsetsA andD of U ×P , denoting the requests that have been authorized and denied,
respectively.
In the case of ABAC, a policy mined from a log should aim to fulll three requirements. e policy should be succinct,
generalize well, and be precise [18]. erefore, we dene an objective function L′ABAC (G, I) as the sum
L′ABAC (G, I) = λ0 ‖I‖+ L1 (G, I) + L2 (G, I) . (16)
e term ‖I‖ is as dened in Section D.1 and aims to make the policy succinct by penalizing complex policies. e term
L1 (G, I) aims to make the mined policy generalize well and is dened as
L1 (G, I) = λ1,1
∑
(u,p)∈A
(
1− ϕI(u, p)
)
+
λ1,2
∑
(u,p)∈D
ϕI(u, p).
Finally, the function L2 (G, I) aims to make the mined policy precise by penalizing policies that authorize too many
requests that are not in the log.
L2 (G, I) = λ2
∑
(u,p)∈U×P\G
ϕI(u, p).
One can show that ϕX (u, p) is diverse, for any (u, p) ∈ U × P . erefore, we can compute Ef 7→b[L′ABAC (G,X)] using
only the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2.
D.3 Business-meaningful RBAC policies
Frank et. al. [30] developed a probabilistic policy miner for RBAC policies that incorporated business information. Aside from
a permission assignment, the miner takes as input an aribute-assignment relationAA ⊆ U ×AVal , where AVal denotes all
possible combination of aribute values. It is assumed that each user is assigned exactly one combination of aribute values.
is miner grants similar sets of roles to users that have similar aribute values. For this, it uses the following formula
∆(u, u′, I) that measures the disagreement between the roles that a policy I assigns to two users u and u′:
∆(u, u′, I) =∑
i≤N
UAI(u, ri)
(
1− 2UAI(u, ri)UAI(u′, ri)
)
.
e formula ‖I‖ below shows how Frank et al.’s miner measures an RBAC policy’s complexity. e complexity increases
whenever two users with the same combination of aribute values get assigned signicantly dierent sets of roles.
‖I‖ = 1
N
∑
u,u′∈U
∑
a∈AVal
AA(u, a)AA(u′, a)∆(u, u′, I).
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Here, N denotes the total of users. Note that AA is a rigid relation symbol representing AA. Its interpretation is therefore
xed and not computed by the policy miner.
To mine business-meaningful RBAC policies, we use the objective function λ ‖I‖ + L (Auth, I;ϕRBACN ), where λ > 0
is a trade-o hyper-parameter. Observe that this objective function penalizes the following types of policies.
• Policies that assign signicantly dierent sets of roles to users with the same aribute values.
• Policies whose assignment of permissions to users substantially diers from the assignment given by Auth .
e random variable ‖X‖ is, however, not diverse. is is because, for i ≤ N , the random fact UAX(u, ri) occurs more
than once in ∆(u, u′,X). Nonetheless, observe that
∆(u, u′,X) =∑
i≤N
UAX(u, ri)− 2
(
UAX(u, ri)
)2
UAX(u′, ri).
One can then compute Ef→b[∆(u, u′,X)] by using the linearity of expectation and the fact that E [Xn] = (E [X])n, for
n ∈ N and X a Bernoulli random variable. Hence,
Ef→b
[
∆(u, u′,X)
]
=∑
i≤N
(
Ef→b
[
UAX(u, ri)
]−
2
(
Ef→b
[
UAX(u, ri)
])2 Ef→b[UAX(u′, ri)]
)
.
One can check that this observation and Lemma 2 suce to compute the expectations necessary for Algorithm 1.
E Mining XACML policies
Although XACML is the de facto standard for access control specication, no algorithm has previously been proposed for
mining XACML policies. We now illustrate how, using Unicorn, we have built the rst XACML policy miner.
E.1 Background
XACML syntax. To simplify the presentation, we use a reduced version of XACML, given as a BNF grammar below. However,
our approach extends to the core XACML. Moreover, our reduced XACML is still powerful enough to express Continue [47,
27], a benchmark XACML policy used for policy analysis.
〈Dec〉 ::= allow | deny
〈Rule〉 ::= (〈Dec〉, α)
〈Comb〉 ::= FirstApp | AllowOv | DenyOv
〈Pol〉 ::= (〈Comb〉, (〈Pol〉∗ | 〈Rule〉∗))
Fix a setAVals of aribute values. An XACML rule is a pair (δ, α), where δ ∈ {allow , deny} is the rule’s decision and α is
a subset of AVals . An XACML policy is a pair (κ, p¯i), where κ ∈ {FirstApp,AllowOv ,DenyOv} is a combination algorithm
and p¯i is either a list of policies or a list of XACML rules. FirstApp, AllowOv , DenyOv denote XACML’s standard policy
combination algorithms. We explain later how they work. For a policy pi, we denote its combination algorithm by Comb (pi)
and, for a rule r, we denote its decision by Dec(r).
XACML semantics. We now recall XACML’s semantics. A request is a subset of AVals denoting the aribute values
that a subject s, an action a, and an object o satisfy when s aempts to execute a on o. We denote by 2AVals the set of requests.
A request satises a rule (δ, α) if the request contains all aributes in α. In this case, if δ = allow , then we say that the rule
authorizes the request; otherwise, we say that the rule denies the request.
A policy pi of the form (AllowOv , (pi′1, . . . , pi′`)) authorizes a request z if there is an i ≤ ` such that pi′i authorizes z. e
policy pi denies z if no pi′i, for i ≤ `, authorizes z, but some pi′j , for j ≤ `, denies it.
A policy pi of the form (DenyOv , (pi′1, . . . , pi′`)) denies a request if some pi′i denies it. e policy authorizes the request if
no pi′i denies it, but some pi′i authorizes it.
A policy pi of the form (FirstApp, (pi′1, . . . , pi′`)) authorizes a request if there is an i ≤ ` such that pi′i authorizes it and
pi′j , for j < i, neither authorizes it nor denies it. e policy denies a request if there is i ≤ ` such that pi′i denies it and pi′j , for
j < i, neither authorizes it nor denies it.
E.2 Auxiliary denitions
For a policy pi = (κ, (pi′1, . . . , pi′`)), we call pi′i a child of pi. A policy is a descendant of pi if it is a child of pi or is a descendant
of a child of pi.
A policy pi has breadth N ∈ N if ` ≤ N and each of pi’s children is either a rule or has breadth N . A policy pi has depth
is M ∈ N (i) if M = 1 and each of its children is a rule, or (ii) if M > 1 and some child of pi has depth M − 1 and the rest
have depth at most M − 1.
Two formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ L are mutually exclusive if there is no I and no z ∈ 2AVals such that both ψI1 (z) and ψI2 (z) hold.
When ψ1 and ψ2 are mutually exclusive, we write ψ1 ⊕ ψ2 instead of ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
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E.3 A template formula for XACML
For M,N ∈ N, we present a template formula for the language of all XACML policies of depth and breadth at most M and
N , respectively.
Let S be the set of allN -ary sequences of length at mostM and let  ∈ S be the empty sequence. For j ∈ {0, . . . , N−1},
we denote by σ . j the result of appending j to σ and by j / σ the result of prepending j to σ.
Let REQS be a sort representing all requests, AVALS be a sort representing all aribute values, and POLS a sort repre-
senting policies and rules. For each σ ∈ S , dene a rigid constant y
σ
symbol of sort POLS such that y
σ
6= y
σ′ , whenever
σ 6= σ′.
e set of rigid constants {y
σ
| σ ∈ S} are intended to represent a tree of XACML policies and rules. e constant y

is the root policy. For σ ∈ S with length less than M and j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the constant y
σ.j
represents one of y
σ
’s
children.
Let z be a variable of sort REQS. e formula ϕXACMLM,N
(
y

, z
)
below is a template formula for the XACML fragment
introduced above. We explain its main parts.
• We dene signature symbols that represent all terminal symbols in the BNF grammar above. For example, we dene two
rigid constant symbols XAllows and XDenies that represent the decisions allow and deny . We dene two exible
function symbols XDec and XComb. For a rigid constant y
σ
, XDec
(
y
σ
)
denotes the decision of the rule represented by
y
σ
. Similarly, XComb
(
y
σ
)
denotes the combination algorithm of the policy represented by y
σ
.
• e formula allows
(
y
σ
, z
)
holds if y
σ
authorizes the request represented by z. e formula denies
(
y
σ
, z
)
holds
if y
σ
denies the request represented by z and is dened analogously. Observe thatallows
(
y
σ
, z
)
anddenies
(
y
σ
, z
)
denote formulas. Hence, allows and denies are not symbols in the signature we use to specify ϕXACMLM,N .
• XActive is a exible relation symbol and XActive
(
y
σ
)
holds if y
σ
is a descendant of y

.
• e formula NA
(
y
σ
, z
)
holds if y
σ
neither authorizes nor denies the request represented by z. It can be expressed in
L as follows:
NA
(
y
σ
, z
)
:= ¬XActive
(
y
σ
)
∨
∧
j≤N
NA
(
y
σ.j
, z
)
.
• e formula z  y
σ
holds if all aributes required by y
σ
are contained by the request represented by z. is formula
can be expressed in L as follows:∧
a∈AVals
(
XRequiresAVal
(
y
σ
, a
)
→ hasAttVal (z, a)
)
,
whereXRequiresAVal is a exible relation symbol and hasAttVal and a, for a ∈ AVals , are rigid symbols. For a policy
I, XRequiresAValI
(
y
σ
, a
)
holds if y
σ
is a rule and requires aribute a to be satised. e formula hasAttVal (z, a)
checks if the request contains aribute a.
ϕXACMLM,N
(
y

, z
)
:= allows
(
y

, z
)
.
allows
(
y
σ
, z
)
:=
(
XIsRule
(
y
σ
)
→ allowsRule
(
y
σ
, z
))
∧(
¬XIsRule
(
y
σ
)
→ allowsPol
(
y
σ
, z
))
.
allowsRule
(
y
σ
, z
)
:= XActive
(
y
σ
)
∧ XDec
(
y
σ
)
= allow ∧ z  y
σ
.
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allowsPol
(
y
σ
, z
)
:= XActive
(
y
σ
)
∧

 XComb(yσ) = AllowOv ∧∨
j≤N allows
(
y
σ.j
, z
) ⊕

XComb
(
y
σ
)
= FirstApp ∧
⊕
j≤N
 ∧i<j NA(yσ.i, z)∧
allows
(
y
σ.j
, z
) 
⊕

XComb
(
y
σ
)
= DenyOv ∧
⊕
j≤N

∧
i<j NA
(
y
σ.i
, z
)
∧
allows
(
y
σ.j
, z
)
∧∧
i<k ¬denies
(
y
σ.k
, z
)



.
Lemma 5. Formula ϕXACMLM,N is a template formula for the language of all XACML policies of depth and breadth at most M
and N , respectively.
Proof. We dene a mapping M from interpretation functions to XACML policies using an auxiliary mapping M′. For a
sequence σ ∈ S , we inductively deneM′ (I, σ) as follows:
• If σ has length M or XActiveI
(
y
σ.j
)
= 0, for all j ≤ N , then
M′ (I, σ) =
(
XDecI
(
y
σ
)
,AV
)
,
where,
AV =
{
a ∈ AVals | XRequiresAValI
(
y
σ
, a
)}
.
• Otherwise,
M′ (I, σ) =
(
XCombI
(
y
σ
)
,
(
M′ (I, σ . j)j≤N
))
.
For an interpretation function I, we deneM (I) = M′ (I, ). We show thatM is surjective. Let pi be a XACML policy.
For σ ∈ S and pi′ a descendant of pi, we inductively dene the following policy:
pi′[σ] :=
{
pi′ if σ =  and
pi′i[σ
′] if σ = i / σ′ and pi′ = (κ, (pi′1, . . . , pi′k)).
We now present an interpretation function I such thatM (I) = pi. Let σ ∈ S and ⊥ be any arbitrary value. en
XActiveI
(
y
σ
)
1 if there is a descendant pi′ of pi
with pi [σ] = pi′ and
0 otherwise.
XCombI
(
y
σ
){Comb (pi[σ]) if pi [σ] is a policy and
⊥ otherwise.
XDecI
(
y
σ
){Dec (pi[σ]) if pi [σ] is a rule and
⊥ otherwise.
XIsRuleI
(
y
σ
){1 if pi [σ] is a rule and
0 otherwise.
XRequiresAValI
(
y
σ
, a
)
1 if pi[σ] is a rule of the form (d, α),
α ⊆ AVals , and a ∈ α
0 otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify thatM (I) = pi.
Having a template formula for this XACML fragment, we now dene an objective function. An example of an objective
function is λ ‖I‖+L (Auth, I;ϕXACMLM,N ), where λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter and ‖I‖ denes I’s complexity. We inductively
dene the complexity compl (pi) of a XACML policy pi as follows.
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• If pi = (δ, α), then compl (pi) = |α|.
• If pi = (κ, (pi1, . . . , pik)), then compl (pi) = |α|.
Finally, we dene ‖I‖ as compl (M (I)).
E.4 Computing expectations
For a formula ϕ ∈ L and a request z ∈ 2AVals , we dene the random variable ϕX (z) in a way similar to the one given in
Section 6.1. We now give some auxiliary denitions that help to compute Ef→b
[(
ϕXACMLM,N
)X
(z)
]
.
Lemma 6. Let z ∈ 2AVals and ψ1, ψ2 be mutually exclusive formulas, then
Ef7→b
[
(ψ1 ⊕ ψ2)X (z)
]
= Ef7→b
[
ψX1 (z)
]
+ Ef7→b
[
ψX2 (z)
]
.
Proof. Note that (ψ1 ⊕ ψ2)I (z) = 1 i either ψI1 (z) = 1 or ψI2 (z) = 1.
Ef7→b
[
(ψ1 ⊕ ψ2)X (z)
]
=
∑
I
q (I) (ψ1 ⊕ ψ2)I (z)
=
∑
I:(ψ1⊕ψ2)I(z)=1
q (I)
=
∑
I:ψI1 (z)=1
q (I) +
∑
I:ψI2 (z)=1
q (I)
=
∑
I
q (I)ψI1 (z) +
∑
I
q (I)ψI2 (z)
= Ef7→b
[
ψX1 (z)
]
+ Ef7→b
[
ψX2 (z)
]
.
Denition 12. A set Φ ⊆ L of formulas is unrelated if for every ϕ ∈ Φ and every atomic formula α occurring in ϕ, there is
no ψ ∈ Φ \ {ϕ} such that α occurs in ϕ. 
Lemma 7. If z ∈ 2AVals and Φ is a set of unrelated formulas, then {ϕX (z) | ϕ ∈ Φ}, under the distribution q, is mutually
independent.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2}. e proof for the general case is analogous.
Observe that, since Φ is unrelated, an interpretation function I can be regarded as the union of two interpretation func-
tions I1 and I2 where I1 interprets the atomic formulas occurring in ϕ1 and I2 interprets those in ϕ2. Consequently, the
distribution q (I) can be factorized as q1 (I1) q2 (I2), where qi, for i ≤ 2, is the marginal mean-eld approximating the joint
distribution of the random facts of ϕi.
For an event A, let Pq (A) denote the probability of A under the distribution q. To prove the lemma, it suces to show,
for b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, that
Pq
(
ϕX1 (z) = b1, ϕ
X
2 (z) = b2
)
=
Pq
(
ϕX1 (z) = b1
)
Pq
(
ϕX2 (z) = b2
)
,
(17)
which implies that Φ is mutually independent.
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Pq
(
ϕX1 (z) = b1, ϕ
X
2 (z) = b2
)
=
∑
I:ϕI1 (z)=b1
ϕI2 (z)=b2
q (I)
=
∑
I:ϕI1 (z)=b1
ϕI2 (z)=b2
q1 (I1) q2 (I2)
=
∑
I1:ϕ
I1
1 (z)=b1
∑
I2:ϕ
I2
2 (z)=b2
q1 (I1) q2 (I2)
=
 ∑
I1:ϕ
I1
1 (z)=b1
q1 (I1)

 ∑
I2:ϕ
I2
2 (z)=b2
q2 (I2)

=
 ∑
I1,I2
I1:ϕ
I1
1 (z)=b1
q1 (I1) q2 (I2)

 ∑
I1,I2
I2:ϕ
I2
2 (z)=b2
q1 (I1) q2 (I2)

=
 ∑
I:ϕI1 (z)=b1
q (I)
 ∑
I:ϕI2 (z)=b2
q (I)

= Pq
(
ϕX1 (z) = b1
)
Pq
(
ϕX2 (z) = b2
)
.
Lemma 8. We can compute Ef→b
[(
ϕXACMLM,N
)X
(z)
]
using only the equations given in Lemmas 3 and 6.
Proof. Observe that every atomic formula in allowsRule
(
y
σ
, z
)
occurs exactly once, so allowsRuleX
(
y
σ
, z
)
is
diverse. Hence, by Corollary 1, we can use Lemma 2 to compute the expectation Ef→b
[
allowsRuleX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
.
e formula allowsPol
(
y
σ
, z
)
can be rewrien as(
XActive
(
y
σ
)
∧ ψ1
(
y
σ
, z
))
⊕
(
XActive
(
y
σ
)
∧ ψ2
(
y
σ
, z
))
⊕(
XActive
(
y
σ
)
∧ ψ3
(
y
σ
, z
))
.
Each formula ψi
(
y
σ
, z
)
is built from a set of unrelated formulas. Hence, by Lemma 7, we can use Lemma 3 to compute
Ef→b
[
ψi
(
y
σ
, z
)]
. Using Lemmas 6 and 3, we can show that
Ef→b
[
allowsPolX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
=
Ef→b
[
XActiveX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
×

Ef→b
[
ψX1
(
y
σ
, z
)]
+
Ef→b
[
ψX2
(
y
σ
, z
)]
+
Ef→b
[
ψX3
(
y
σ
, z
)]
 .
erefore, Ef→b
[
allowsPolX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
can be computed using only Lemmas 6 and 3.
Finally, recall that ϕXACMLM,N
(
y

, z
)
= allows
(
y

, z
)
. Observe now that allows
(
y

, z
)
is built from the following
unrelated set: {
XIsRule
(
y
σ
)
,allowsRule
(
y
σ
, z
)
,allowsPol
(
y
σ
, z
)}
.
By Lemma 7, the corresponding set of random variables is independent. Hence, we can use Lemma 3 to reduce the computation
ofEf→b
[(
ϕXACMLM,N
)X
(z)
]
to the computation ofEf→b
[
XIsRuleX
(
y
σ
)]
,Ef→b
[
allowsRuleX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
, andEf→b
[
allowsPolX
(
y
σ
, z
)]
.
However, as observed above, all these expectations can be computed using Lemmas 3 and 6. Hence, we can compute
Ef→b
[(
ϕXACMLM,N
)X
(z)
]
using only those two lemmas.
Having proven the previous lemmas, we can now implement Algorithm 1 to produce a policy miner for XACML policies.
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F Modeling RBAC temporal constraints
F.1 Periodic expressions
We recall here the denition of temporal constraints and then explain how we model them in our language L. We start by
dening a periodic expression. In order to prove some results, we use a formal denition instead of the original denition [6].
Denition 13. A calendar sequence is a tuple C = (C0, . . . , Cn) of strings. Each Ci, for i ≤ n, is called a calendar. 
Each string in a calendar sequence denotes a time unit. A standard example of a calendar sequence is Cs = (“Months′′,
“Days′′, “Hours′′, “Hours′′). e string “Hours′′ intentionally occurs twice.
Denition 14. Let C = (Ci)i≤n be a calendar sequence. A C-periodic expression is a tuple
(O1, O2, . . . , On−1,w) ∈
(
2N
)n−1
× N.
e set of all C-periodic expressions is denoted by PEx (C). 
Intuitively, for i < n, the set Oi represents a set of time units in Ci and r is a time length, measured with the unit Cn.
We give an example.
Example 6. Let Cs = (“Months′′, “Days′′, “Hours′′, “Hours′′). e rst eight hours of the rst and h day of each even
month can be represented with the following Cs-periodic expression:
({2, 4, . . . , 12} , {1, 5} , {1} , 8) .
Here, the rst set in the tuple denotes the even months, the second set denotes the rst and h day, the third set denotes
the rst hour, and the last number denotes the 8-hour length. 
Denition 15. LetC = (Ci)i≤n be a calendar sequence. AC-time instant t is a tuple inN
n−1. AC-time instant t = (ti)i<n
satises a C-periodic expression (O1, . . . , On−1,w) if all of the following hold:
• For i < n− 1, ti ∈ Oi.
• ere is t′n−1 ∈ On−1 such that t′n−1 ≤ tn−1 < t′n−1 ⊕ w. Here, t′n−1 ⊕ w is the result of transforming t′n−1 and w
to a common time unit and then adding them.

Example 7. Let P be the Cs-periodic expression from Example 6. en the Cs-time instant (4, 1, 2) (i.e., the second hour
of the rst day of April) satises P , whereas the Cs-time instant (5, 1, 2) (i.e., the second hour of the rst day of May) does
not. 
F.2 Formalizing periodic expressions in L
Let C be a calendar sequence. We now show how to formalize periodic expressions in PEx (C) in our language L. For
illustration, we show how to do this when C = Cs, but the general case is analogous. We start by dening a signature for
dening temporal constraints. We rst formally introduce the components of this signature and then give some intuition.
Denition 16. Let Σt be a signature containing the following:
• A sort INSTANTS for denoting Cs-time instants.
• ree sorts MONTHS,DAYS,HOURS for denoting months, days, and hours, respectively.
• ree exible unary relation symbols:
– PM : MONTHS.
– PD : DAYS.
– PH : HOURS.
• ree rigid unary function symbols:
– monthOf : INSTANTS→ MONTHS.
– dayOf : INSTANTS→ DAYS.
– hourOf : INSTANTS→ HOURS.
• Rigid binary relation symbols ≤: HOURS×HOURS and <: HOURS×HOURS.
• Rigid constant symbols 1, 2, . . . , 12 of sort MONTHS.
• Rigid constant symbols 1, 2, . . . , 31 of sort DAYS.
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• Rigid constant symbols 1, 2, . . . , 24 of sort HOURS.

For an interpretation function I, the sets PM I, PDI, and PH I dene the rst three entries of a Cs-periodic expression.
e functions monthOf I, dayOf I, and hourOf I compute, respectively, the month, day, and hour of a time instant. Recall
that monthOf , dayOf , and hourOf are rigid symbols, so monthOf I, dayOf I, and hourOf I do not depend on I.
Let INSTANTS be a sort denotingCs-time instants, t be a variable of sort INSTANTS, andϕ (t) be the following formula: ∨
1≤m≤12
(
PM (m) ∧monthOf (t) = m)
∧
 ∨
1≤d≤31
(
PD (d) ∧ dayOf (t) = d)
∧
 ∨
1≤h≤24
(
PH (h) ∧ h ≤ hourOf (t) < h + w)
 .
Denition 17. We deneM as the following mapping from interpretation functions to PEx (Cs) dened as follows. For
an interpretation function I,M (I) := (MI, DI, HI, 1), where
• MI :=
{
m | m ∈ PM I},
• DI :=
{
d | d ∈ PDI},
• HI :=
{
h | h′ ≤ h < h′ + wI, for some h′ ∈ PH I}.

We useM to prove eorem 2 below, which claims that ϕ is a template formula for the set of periodic expressions. Note
thatM is not surjective on PEx (Cs). However, any periodic expression (O1, O2, O3,w) is equivalent to an expression of
the form (O1, O2, Ow3 , 1), whereOw3 := {o + w’ | o ∈ O3,w′ < w} .erefore, althoughM is not surjective, it is expressive
enough to capture all periodic expressions up to equivalence.
eorem 2. For every interpretation function I, a Cs-time instant t = (m, d, h) satises M (I) = (MI, DI, HI, 1) i
t ∈ ϕI.
Proof.
t satisesM (I)
⇔ m ∈MI, d ∈ DI, h ∈ HI
⇔ m ∈ PM I, d ∈ PDI, there is h′ ∈ PH I s.t. h′ ≤ h < h′ + wI
⇔
 m ∈ PM I, monthOf I (t) = m,d ∈ PDI, dayOf I (t) = d,
there is h′ ∈ PH I s.t. h′ ≤ h < h′ + wI, hourOf I (t) = h

⇔ t ∈ ϕI.
G Datasets and synthetic policies used for experiments
G.1 Datasets for BM-RBAC
We use the access control matrix provided by Amazon for the IEEE MLSP 2012 competition [38]. ey assign three types
of permissions, named “HOST”, “PERM GROUP”, and “SYSTEM GROUP”. For each type of permission, we created an access
control matrix by collecting all users and all permissions belonging to that type. ere are approximately 30,000 users, 1,700
permissions of type “HOST”, 6,000 of type “PERM GROUP”, and 20,000 of type “SYSTEM GROUP”.
e resulting access control matrices are far too large to be handled eciently by the policy miner we developed. To ad-
dress this, during 5-fold cross-validation (see Section B for an overview), we worked instead with an access control submatrix
induced by a sample of 30% of all users. Each fold used a dierent sample of users. To see why this is enough, we remark that,
in RBAC policies, the number R of roles is usually much smaller than the number N of users. Moreover, the number K of
possible subsets of permissions that users are assigned by RBAC policies is small in comparison to the whole set of possible
subsets of permissions. If N is much larger than K , then, by the pidgeonhole principle, many users have the same subset of
permissions. erefore, it is not necessary to use allN users to mine an adequate RBAC policy, as only a fraction of them has
all the necessary information. e high TPR (above 80%) of the policy that we mined supports the fact that using a submatrix
is still enough to mine policies that generalize well.
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G.2 Synthetic policy for spatio-temporal RBAC
We present here the synthetic spatio-temporal RBAC policy that we used for our experiments. We assume the existence of ve
rectangular buildings, described in Table 10. e le column indicates the building’s name and the right column describes the
two-dimensional coordinates of the building’s corners. ere are ve roles, which we describe next. We regard a permission
as an action executed on an object.
Name Corners
Main building (1, 3), (1, 4), (4, 4), (4, 3)
Library (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 1)
Station (8, 1), (8, 9), (9, 9), (9, 1)
Laboratory (2, 6), (2, 8), (4, 8), (4, 6)
Computer room (6, 6), (6, 7), (7, 7), (7, 6)
Table 10
e rst role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• e user is at most 1 meter away from the computer room.
• e object is in the computer room or in the laboratory.
• e current day is an odd day of the month.
• e current time is between 8AM and 5PM.
e second role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• e user is outside the library.
• e object is at most 1 meter away from the library.
• Either
– the current day is before the 10th day of the month and the current time is between 2PM and 8PM or
– the current day is aer the 15th day of the month and the current time is between 8AM and 12PM.
e third role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• e user is at most 3 meters away from the main building.
• e object is at most 3 meters away from the main building.
e fourth role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• e user is inside the library.
• e object is outside the library.
• e current day is before the 15th day of the month.
• e current time is between 12AM and 12PM.
e h role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• e user is inside the main building, at most 1 meter away from the library, inside the laboratory, at most 2 meters
away from the computer room, or inside the station.
• e object satises the same spatial constraint.
• e current day is before the 15th day of the month.
• e current time is between 12AM and 12PM.
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